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of the ordinance or statute.14 Thus if, as in the instant case, the intent
of the legislative body was merely to raise revenue and not to regulate or
limit the distribution of literature in any way, the tax would be valid.
The latter view overlooks the fact that as a practical matter many
groups may be denied the opportunity to express and circulate their ideas
freely by a tax which exceeds their individual financial resources. Since
unrestricted circulation of ideas is largely dependent upon the sale of
literature to defray the cost of publication, the suggestion of the present
and other courts that the tax may be avoided by giving the literature free
of charge' 5 is without merit. 8 Therefore it is submitted that in cases
involving freedom of speech as affected by a tax, the validity of the tax
should depend on its tendency to limit the free circulation of ideas.
D.C.
CRIMINAL LAW-APPEAL IN FORMiA PAuPnnRs OR IN PROPRIA PERSONA-
AFFIRMATVE DUTY or JuD. To INFoRm AccusED OF HIS RI iHTS-[Fed-
eral].-Within the period allowed for appeal, plaintiff, convicted under the
pandering act,' wrote a letter to the trial judge from prison stating that
he wished to appeal, that he was uncertain of the intentions of volunteer
and assigned counsel, and that he requested that these latter proceed with
an appeal in his behalf. After the time for noting appeal had expired, the
judge notified petitioner that matters of this sort must be taken care of
by counsel, and that he was forwarding petitioner's letter to counsel who
had represented him. These latter notified petitioner that they did not
care to represent him. After further correspondence, the judge called in
the former counsel and the district attorney for a conference, at which it
was decided that appellant had only a remote chance of reversal; the judge
notified the prisoner that as a consequence he did not feel justified in
appointing new counsel to prosecute an appeal. Petitioner sought habeas
corpus on the ground that the court's action deprived him of the right
of appeal in propria persona as well as by counsel, solely on account of
his poverty, which constituted an unconstitutional discrimination, rendering
his conviction, sentence, and further detention invalid. Held: Accused was
not entitled to immediate freedom on habeas corpus, since an appeal was to
be considered as taken and pending. The trial court owed an affirmative
duty to petitioner to inform him of his rights. Boykin V. Hui4. 2
The opinion of the appellate court leaves the reader in doubt as to
14. Accord: Giragi v. Moore (1936) 48 Ariz. 33, 58 P. (2d) 1249, 64 P.(2d) 819, 110 A. L. R. 314.
15. The Arkansas Supreme Court in the recent case of Cole v. City of
Fort Smith (Ark. 1941) 151 S. W. (2d) 1000, invalidated an ordinance
taxing the free distribution of literature while upholding an ordinance
taxing the sale of literature.
16. See Hannan v. Haverhill (C. C. A. 1, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 87, cert.
den. (1941) 62 S. Ct. 81. For a well reasoned opinion by a lower court
on this point see Mullaly v. Banks (1938) 168 Misc. 515, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 41.
1. (1910) 36 Stat. 833, c. 404, §3, D. C. Code (1940) tit. 22, §2707.
2. (App. D. C. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 865.
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
several material points: (1) for what relief it considered the petitioner
-was asking in his letters; (2) what it thought the lower court was trying
to do; (3) the precise nature of the lower court's error. The solution to
each of these problems, in turn, would depend upon what the appellate
court believed the petitioner's letters to mean. Analytically considered, the
correspondence might have constituted any one or all of the following: a
petition for assignment of counsel, for appeal in forna pauperis, or for
appeal in propria persona.
Although the government contended that the trial judge had regarded
the correspondence as presenting in part an application for assignment of
counsel, the appellate court did not pass upon this contention. The trial
court could in its discretion have refused to appoint counsel if it thought
the appeal was frivolous or malicious.3 Furthermore, it could deny the
appeal under the forma pauperis statute if it were not taken in good faith.'
The appellate court pointed out that petitioner had not specifically asked
for an appeal in forma pauperis. Since he had not, the trial court had no
discretionary right to deny the appeal upon the merits of the case.5 If,
under the forma pauperis statute, the trial judge could have denied the
appeal to a poor person on grounds which would not suffice if the appellant
had sufficient means to prosecute a formal appeal, there might be some
doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute. Due process under the Fifth
Amendment,8 as under the Fourteenth,7 does not require appellate review,
3. (1892) 27 Stat. 252, c. 209, §4, 28 U. S. C. A. §835. This statute
provides for dismissal if the "allegation of poverty is untrue, or if said
court be satisfied that the alleged cause of action is frivolous or malicious."
Failure to take an appeal because not advised by counsel does not in-
validate a judgment. Lovvorn v. Johnston (C. C. A. 9, 1941) 118 F. (2d)
704. Further, it has been held that an allegation that petitioner was unable
to secure further assistance of counsel did not disclose circumstances justi-
fying issuance of habeas corpus, since appeal was not necessary to due
process. DeMaurez v. Swope (C. C. A. 9, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 758.
4. (1922) 42 Stat. 666, c. 246, 28 U. S. C. A. §832. This section pro-
rides for aid "unless the trial court shall certify in writing that in the
opinion of the court such appeal or writ of error is not taken in good
faith, * * * "
5. The trial judge is given no authority concerning the taking of appeals
in criminal cases. Rule III, 28 U. S. C. A. §723a, now 18 U. S. C. A.§688 provides that "Appeals shall be taken by filing with the clerk of the
trial court a notice, in duplicate, stating that the defendant appeals from
the judgment, and by serving a copy of the notice upon the United States
Attorney."
6. It is considered that the right to review by an appellate court of ajudgment of conviction is not essential to due process of law, since all
the rights of the accused necessary to due process are fully protected in
the trial court. Haywood v. U. S. (C. C. A. 7, 1920) 268 Fed. 795, cert.
den. (1921) 256 U. S. 689; United States v. St. Clair (C. C. A. 8, 1930)
42 F. (2d) 26. Consequently, the right is purely statutory and may be
made to depend upon conditions. American Surety Co. v. U. S. (C. C. A.
5, 1917) 289 Fed. 680, 152 C. C. A. 514; Williams v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8,
1924) 1 F. (2d) 203; United States v. St. Clair (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 42 F.
(2d) 26; DeMaurez v. Swope (C. C. A. 9, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 758.
7. The practice prevalent in this country is to allow appeal in criminal
cases as a matter of right, Smyth, The Limitation of the Right of Appeal
in Criminal Cases (1904) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 317. However, the right is
19421
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but when the right to review is granted by statute, it is a substantial one.
8
If petitioner had been deprived of that right on grounds which would not
suffice if he had sufficient means, and if there was no way to remedy the
error, habeas corpus might have been granted.9 Historically, in civil litiga-
tion, there has often been discrimination between rich and poor.' 0 In most
states, however, aid in some form is granted to indigent defendants in
criminal cases.11 Where life and liberty are concerned, a stricter view of
granted purely as a matter of statute or constitution in the individual
state, and is not required as a matter of due process. Reetz v. Michigan
(1903) 188 U. S. 505, 508; State v. Guerringer (1915) 265 Mo. 408, 178
S. W. 65. See also 24 C. J. S. 205, §1623, 212, §1628, and cases cited.
8. Smyth, Limitation of the Right of Appeal in Criminal Cases (1904)
17 Harv. L. Rev. 317. 17 C. J. 14, n. 53; 24 C. J. S. 214, §1628, and cases
cited at n. 43. See also Orfield, Federal Criminal Appeals (1936) 45 Yale
L. J. 1223 for a discussion of the scope of the right of appeal.
The court i% the instant case indicates the substantiality of the right
of appeal by reference to the volume of reversals in criminal cases. During
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1940, reversals were had in 24% of criminal
cases in which appeals were taken to the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (1940) 59.
9. Thus it has been held that one convicted without counsel, and ignorant
of the right to appeal or proceedings of appeal was entitled to habeas corpus.
Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U. S. 458. In State v. Guerringer (1915)
265 Mo. 408, 415-416, 178 S. W. 65, where a convicted defendant had no
opportunity to file a motion for new trial owing to the expiration of the
term of court immediately upon return of the verdict, it was said: "While
the right of appeal is not essential to due process of law (Reetz v. Michi-
gan, 188 U. S. 508), yet if an appeal be allowed to some persons and
mot to all persons similarly situated, such deprivation of the right to an
appeal is equivalent to the denial of due process of law, * * *."
The court in the instant case did not decide the point, since it con-
sidered the appeal as pending.
10. See Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation (1923) 36 Harv. L. Rev.
361, which deals with for'm paupe-is proceedings in the trial courts.
11. See Note (1936) 100 A. L. R. 321, which sets forth the different
types of aid granted. In Missouri, the statutes provide merely that a free
transcript of the evidence shall be furnished. R. S. Mo. (1939) §13354.
It seems, however, that the statute applies only in counties and cities over
100,000 population.
Mandamus has been granted to require the judge to order the stenog-
rapher to furnish such a transcript. State ex rel. Martin v. Wofford (1894)
121 Mo. 61, 25 S. W. 851; State ex rel. Lashley v. Ittner (1926) 315 Mo.
68, 292 S. W. 707. State v. Pieski (1913) 248 Mo. 715, 154 S. W. 747
indicated that although there was no express statutory authority for prose-
cuting an appeal in a criminal case in form pauperis, there could be such
an appeal by implication from other statutory provisions; but that orders
granting such an appeal were not binding except in the court where the
order was made. In addition, the application to prosecute an appeal as a
poor person must be made within the one year period allowed for per-
fecting appeals. State v. Moulton (1914) 262 Mo. 137, 170 S. W. 1111.
The provision for transcripts, without more, is apt to become a burden
upon the courts. In State v. Ernest (1899) 150 Mo. 347, 349, 51 S. W.
688, 688, the court said: "Why the legislature should impose upon this
court, with an overburdened docket, the duty of reading immense transcripts
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due process might be taken than where only property rights were involved.
If petitioner's correspondence constituted an application for an appeal
in propria persona, the objection could be made that the federal rules of
criminal procedure were not followed. Since these rules were especially
designed in the interest of dispatch, and appellant neither filed his formal
appeal within the five day limit nor paid the $5.00 filing fee required, his
appeal had not been perfected formally.12 The appellate court said, how-
ever, that since the trial court had erred in not performing its duty to
inform petitioner of his right to appeal in propria persona, it had prevented
him from perfecting an appeal according to the formal requisites.13 The
right to appeal in one's own person has long been recognized. The common
law rule was that all persons should appear in person.14 Even the con-
stitutional provision for counsel in a criminal trial is permissive and con-
ditional upon the pleasure of the accused.' 5 Where, as here, a person with-
out counsel, ignorant of the law, and confined to prison, has expressed his
desire to take an appeal, it seems just to require the trial judge to inform
him of his rights.' 6 Consequently, although it is generally said that habeas
eorpus cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal,17 here the appellate
in search for errors without the aid of briefs on either side is past our
comprehension. * * * The circuit judges of St. Louis have no discretion.
The law requires them to order the free transcript, but the circuit courts
in the country have a discretion, and we think it should only be exercised
in giving free transcripts where they have grave doubts as to their judg-
ments."
12. Rule III, 28 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1940) §723a, now 18 U. S. C. A.§688. In re Crum (C. C. A. 9, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 746; United States v.
Tousey (C. C. A. 7, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 892. That filing the appeal within
the five day period is jurisdictional, see Fewox v. U. S. (C. C. A. 5, 1935)
77 F. (2d) 699; Burr v. U. S. (C. C. A. 7, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 502. This
period is expressly tolled during the pendency of an ordinary motion for
new trial, provided the motion is timely. O'Gwin v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9,
1937) 90 F. (2d) 494; Decker v. U. S. (C. C. A. 5, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 473.
An appeal from the denial of a motion to modify a judgment was rejected
as a mere attempt to circumvent the rule. Dembrofsky v. U. S. (C. C. A.
1, 1936) 86 F. (2d) 677. See also Note (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 984.
13. The court said: "In our view, therefore, the appeal should be con-
sidered as having been taken in time. Consequently the jurisdiction of this
-court attached to the cause. Nor do we think it has been lost by the
failure to perfect the record and present the appeal. The trial court's
action prevented appellant, as well as itself and its officials, from taking
steps to this end in accordance with the usual procedure under the rules."
Boykin v. Huff (App. D. C. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 865, 873.
14. State ex rel. Wolfe v. Kirke (1868) 12 Fla. 278, 95 Am. Dec. 314.
At common law prisoners accused of felony were denied the right to counsel.
See 5 A. 3. 267.
15. State v. Yoes (1910) 67 W. Va. 546, 68 S. W. 181, 140 Am. St. Rep.
978. See also 5 A. J. 267.
16. In ex parte Ah Sam (1890) 83 Cal. 620, 24 Pac. 276, it was said
that the contention could not be raised on habeas corpus that petitioner
had not been informed of his rights but might be raised on appeal. See also
Jacoby v. Waddell (1883) 61 Iowa 247, 16 N. W. 119.
17. Ex parte Watkins (U. S. 1830) 3 Pet. 193; Re Lincoln (1906) 202
U. S. 178; United States ex rel. Morgan v. Hill (C. C. A. 7, 1932) 56 F.
19421
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court, on habeas corpus, in effect gave petitioner a declaratory judgment
that his appeal was pending.
L. E. M.
V.M.
TAXATION-BEQUEST TO CHARITABLE on RELIGIOUS CORPORATION-EFFECT
or POLITICAL AcTmvr-[Federal].-Testatrix died in 1933 leaving a be-
quest to the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals of the
Methodist Episcopal Church. Petitioner, executor of deceased, contended
that this bequest came within the provisions of the Revenue Act of 19261
which authorized the deduction from the value of the gross estate of the
amount of all bequests "to or for the use of any corporation organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary or edu-
cational purposes." The certificate of incorporation of the beneficiary stated
that its objects were to promote temperance by every legitimate means
and to aid such causes as would advance public welfare.2 The beneficiary
having no by-laws of its own, operated under the constitution of the church
which expressly stated among its purposes the securing of legislation
throughout the world to suppress traffic in liquor and narcotics3 In prac-
tice, the Board of Temperance participated in political activity and pub-
lished propaganda. The Board of Tax Appeals disallowed the deduction
on the ground that the Board of Temperance was not engaged exclusively
in any or all of the purposes enumerated in the statute.' Held: reversed,
for petitioner. The beneficiary was organized exclusively for religious pur-
poses, and its political activity was merely an incidental and natural part
of its attempt to spread its views. One judge dissented. Girard Trust Go. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.5
Two questions are apparent in this case. First, do the purposes of the
beneficiary qualify as one or more of the five kinds listed by the statute?
(2d) 146, cert. den. (1932) 286 U. S. 550; Ex parte Clay (1889) 98 Mo.
578, 11 S. W. 998; Ex parte Mitchell (1891) 104 Mo. 121, 16 S. W. 118;
Finkelnburg and Williams, Missouri Appellate Practice (2d ed. 1906) 244;
25 A. J. 157.
1. Revenue Act 1926, 44 Stat. 9, c. 27, §303 (a) (3), 26 U. S. C. A. Int.
Rev. Acts, p. 234.
2. "To promote the cause of temperance by every legitimate means; to
prevent the improper use of drugs and narcotics; to render aid to such
causes as in the judgment of the board of trustees, tend to advance the
public welfare."
3. Article 478 of the Discipline of 1922 provides: "Section 2. Article 1.
The object of this Board is to promote voluntary total abstinence from all
intoxicants and narcotics, to promote observance and enforcement of all
existing constitutional provisions and statutory enactments that suppress
the liquor traffic and the traffic in narcotic drugs, to promote the speedy
enactment of such legislation throughout the world, and to defend and
maintain established civil and religious liberties."
4. Girard Trust Company and W. Nelson L. West, Executors of the
Estate of Ida Simpson, deceased (1940) 41 B. T. A. 157.
5. (C. C. A. 3, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 108.
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